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IS SAME-SEX MARRIAGE A THREAT TO 
TRADITIONAL MARRIAGES?: HOW COURTS 
STRUGGLE WITH THE QUESTION 
Legal recognition of same-sex marriages
1
 has only recently become 
one of the leading issues in American politics,
2
 but the history of related 
impact litigation goes back four decades.
3
 Although the arguments raised 
 
 
 1. ―‗Homosexual‘ and ‗same-sex‘ marriages are not synonymous . . . . Parties to ‗a union 
between a man and a woman‘ may or may not be homosexuals. Parties to a same-sex marriage could 
theoretically be either homosexuals or heterosexuals.‖ Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 51 n.11 (Haw. 
1993). Accordingly, this Note uses the term ―same-sex marriage‖ rather than ―gay marriage.‖ None of 
the American states directly regulate marriage based upon sexual orientation. Instead, most regulate 
marriage based upon the combination of genders of the parties involved. If a state were to issue 
marriage licenses based on sexual orientation, it might face a challenge under a state or federal due 
process constitutional provision. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003) (holding, in 
reference to due process provisions, that ―our laws and tradition afford constitutional protection to 
personal decisions relating to marriage‖); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95 (1987) (―[T]he decision to 
marry is a fundamental right.‖); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978). 
 2. State-level legal recognition of same-sex marriages has instigated the passage of broad-
reaching federal laws, affected the outcome of a presidential election, and led to attempts to amend the 
state and federal constitutions. In 1996, the prospect that the Supreme Court of Hawaii might require 
that state to recognize same-sex marriages led to the enactment of the Federal Defense of Marriage 
Act, which prohibits the federal government from recognizing same-sex marriages for any purpose and 
provides that states cannot be required to recognize same-sex marriages performed in other 
jurisdictions. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 1–18 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 
2905–23 (―[T]he state courts in Hawaii appear to be on the verge of requiring that State to issue 
marriage licenses to same-sex couples.‖ Id. at 2, reprinted at 2906. ―[I]t is critical to understand the 
nature of the orchestrated assault being waged against traditional heterosexual marriage by gay rights 
groups and their lawyers.‖ Id. at 2–3, reprinted at 2906–07); see Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 
104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 and 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006)); see also 
Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963, 1032 (Wash. 2006) (Bridge, J., dissenting) (arguing that the 
title ―Defense of Marriage Act‖ reveals that the purpose of the law is to force a minority group to abide 
by the majority‘s perception of tradition); see, e.g., Craig Crawford, Supporters Look to Bush to Back 
Gay Marriage Ban, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2004, http://www.nytimes.com/cq/2004/11/05/news-
1413230.html (naming same-sex marriage recognition as ―the issue that most helped re-elect President 
Bush‖ in the 2004 presidential election and describing the use of the issue in his campaign). There 
have been several attempts since Baehr and subsequent same-sex marriage cases to amend the Federal 
Constitution to preclude any recognition of same-sex marriages in all American jurisdictions. See, e.g., 
H.R.J. Res. 93, 107th Cong. (2002); H.R.J. Res. 56 and S.J. Res. 26, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R.J. Res. 
106 and S.J. Res. 30, 108th Cong. (2004); H.R.J. Res. 39 and S.J. Res. 1, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R.J. 
Res. 88, 109th Cong. (2006); H.R.J. Res. 22, H.R.J. Res. 74, and S.J. Res. 43, 110th Cong. (2007); 
H.R.J. Res. 89, 110th Cong. (2008); H.R.J. Res. 37 and H.R.J. Res. 50, 111th Cong. (2009); H.R.J. 
Res. 45, 112th Cong. (2011). See infra note 52 for a list of state constitutional amendments. 
 3. The first equal protection challenge to a same-sex marriage ban was heard by the Supreme 
Court of Minnesota forty years ago. See Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971). Although a 
New York court had dealt with the recognition of same-sex marriages two months before Baker, the 
New York case was a unique situation in which an adult male plaintiff underwent a marriage 
ceremony with the defendant, whom he believed to be a woman but who was in fact another man. 
Anonymous v. Anonymous, 325 N.Y.S.2d 499 (N.Y. Spec. Term 1971). The plaintiff accordingly 
sought a declaration of his marital status, but no equal protection arguments were raised. Id. The 
unusual circumstances behind that case would prevent the ruling from having broader precedential 
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in the litigation have developed over the years, one argument has 
persisted: that the State has an interest in preserving the traditional 
institution of marriage.
4
 
Same-sex marriage litigation in the United States has generally 
proceeded as a challenge to a state‘s statutory ban of same-sex marriage 
recognition under the state constitution‘s equal protection provision.5 
States have consistently defended their bans on the grounds that there is a 
legitimate state interest in protecting or promoting the traditional 
institution of marriage, and that this interest is furthered by preventing the 
legal recognition of same-sex marriages.
6
 Despite the ubiquity of this 
argument, the responses it has received in courts have varied widely. Some 
courts have accepted the argument and held that there is a legitimate state 
interest that is furthered by the same-sex marriage ban;
7
 others have 
 
 
effect. In contrast, the Baker case involved a challenge by two men under the Federal Equal Protection 
Clause to the state‘s decision to deny them a marriage license solely because they were of the same 
sex. 191 N.W.2d at 186. Thus, had the case been successful, it would have mandated legal recognition 
of same-sex marriages throughout the State of Minnesota, and it can fairly be characterized as impact 
litigation. See also McConnell v. Nooner, 547 F.2d 54 (8th Cir. 1976) and McConnell v. United States, 
188 Fed. Appx. 540 (8th Cir. 2006), which together present the case of the same couple who, after 
receiving a (presumptively invalid) Minnesota marriage license despite the adverse ruling in Baker, 
attempted to compel the Veterans Administration and the Internal Revenue Service to treat them as 
married. 
 4. See infra notes 7–10 for cases dealing with the argument. 
 5. See infra notes 7–10. Minnesota‘s 1971 case Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, as a failed 
Federal Equal Protection Clause challenge to a same-sex marriage ban raised in state court, is the 
exception to this rule. The subsequent dismissal of appeal by the Supreme Court of the United States 
in Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972) discouraged other plaintiffs from bringing challenges under 
the Federal Equal Protection Clause in the courts of other states. Several courts have held that the 
dismissal of an appeal constitutes a binding Supreme Court ruling on the merits of the case, although 
at least one federal court has found otherwise. See infra note 27 and accompanying text. 
 6. See infra notes 7–10. The rare exceptions to this rule were mostly decided before the 
Supreme Court of Hawaii decision in Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993), in which that court 
appeared to give serious thought to the possibility of mandating same-sex marriage recognition. See 
infra notes 29–36 and accompanying text. One of the numerous repercussions of this decision, see 
supra note 2, was to encourage defenders of the non-recognition of same-sex marriage to raise a more 
vigorous defense, such as arguing that same-sex marriage would threaten the traditional institution of 
marriage. The only state supreme court in those states that have had post-Baehr same-sex marriage 
recognition suits not to be confronted with the traditional institution argument in some form is the 
Supreme Court of New Jersey, in Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006). See infra note 8. 
 7. See, e.g., Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1197 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974) (holding that the 
traditional institution of marriage is sufficiently intertwined with society to prevent courts from 
holding that legislatures have no rational basis for preventing same-sex couples from accessing it); 
Standhart v. Superior Court, 77 P.3d 451 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that although the State‘s 
denial of same-sex marriage recognition might result in some inequity, rational basis review did not 
require the State to show a perfect fit between the law and the interests it advanced, and thus deciding 
that the State‘s asserted interest in maintaining the traditional institution in order to channel 
procreation into heterosexual married couples was sufficient to satisfy rational basis review); Morrison 
v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15, 23 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that preserving the traditional institution of 
marriage would be presumed to be a legitimate state interest unless the plaintiffs could prove that legal 
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subjected it to critical analysis and have partially accepted it, finding an 
equal protection violation but allowing the legislature to remedy the 
violation by creating a parallel institution (often called a ―civil union‖) that 
is intended to have all the substantive benefits of civil marriage;
8
 and some 
courts have rejected the argument as a red herring.
9
 Several courts have 
found ways to avoid addressing the argument at all.
10
 
 
 
recognition of same-sex marriage would promote all of the state interests furthered by the recognition 
of traditional marriages); Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 630–33 (Md. 2007) (holding that although 
the State‘s limitation of marriage to heterosexual couples might be both over-inclusive and under-
inclusive as applied toward the goal of channeling procreation into heterosexual relationships, ―[a] 
legislative enactment reviewed under a rational basis standard of constitutional review need not be 
drawn with mathematical exactitude‖); Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 21–22 (N.Y. 2006) 
(holding that the State‘s asserted interest in maintaining the traditional institution of marriage in order 
to channel procreation into heterosexual married couples was by itself sufficient to satisfy rational 
basis review because rational basis review did not require a perfect fit). But see id. at 26, 33 (Kaye, 
C.J., dissenting) (arguing that the State‘s interests in channeling procreation or in maintaining a 
traditional institution for tradition‘s sake were not sufficient to satisfy rational basis review). Some 
federal courts give the argument summary acceptance. See Adams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036, 1042–
43 (9th Cir. 1982) (accepting with minimal analysis the argument as a legitimate state interest for the 
purposes of immigration laws); Citizens for Equal Protection v. Bruning, 455 F.3d 859, 867–68 (8th 
Cir. 2006) (holding that it is beyond the competence of courts to decide that the traditional institution 
of marriage is not promoted by a same-sex marriage ban). 
 8. See, e.g., Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 886–87 (Vt. 1999); Lewis, 908 A.2d at 224. Lewis 
appears to be unique among post-Baehr equal protection challenges to same-sex marriage bans in that 
the court was not faced with the argument that the ban furthered a legitimate state interest in promoting 
the traditional institution of marriage. Id. at 217. Despite this, the argument did receive some 
discussion in the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Poritz. Id. at 228–30. 
 9. See, e.g., Goodridge v. Dept. of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (see infra notes 
10, 48–50 and accompanying text); In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008) (see infra notes 
53, 55–56 and accompanying text); Kerrigan v. Comm‘r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008) 
(see infra notes 54, 57 and accompanying text); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009) (see 
infra notes 58–61 and accompanying text); Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374, 389 (D. 
Mass. 2010) (―[T]his court cannot discern a means by which the federal government‘s denial of 
benefits to same-sex spouses might encourage homosexual people to marry members of the opposite 
sex. And denying marriage-based benefits to same-sex spouses certainly bears no reasonable relation 
to any interest the government might have in making heterosexual marriages more secure.‖); Perry v. 
Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 972 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (relying on statistical evidence to find 
that ―[p]ermitting same-sex couples to marry will not affect the number of opposite-sex couples who 
marry, divorce, cohabit, have children outside of marriage or otherwise affect the stability of opposite-
sex marriages‖). 
 10. See, e.g., Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d at 186 (forestalling the issue by holding that marriage 
is an institution that predates the State, so the State does not engage in state action by defining 
marriage, but instead promotes the legitimate state interest of upholding tradition). But see Goodridge, 
798 N.E.2d at 961–62 n.23 (―[I]t is circular reasoning, not analysis, to maintain that marriage must 
remain a heterosexual institution because that is what it historically has been.‖). See, e.g., Jones v. 
Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588, 589–90 (Ky. 1973) (relying on a dictionary definition of the term 
―marriage‖ to find that the exclusion of same-sex couples from civil marriage resulted not from state 
action, but rather from a lack of capacity of two people of the same sex to marry, and thereby avoiding 
a finding of state action and thus any constitutional question which might invoke the argument); Baehr 
v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993) (taking note of the argument but remanding the case to the trial 
court on procedural grounds, see infra note 32 and accompanying text, despite the concerns of a 
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German
11
 courts began to examine the putative threat posed to 
marriage by the legal recognition of same-sex unions in 2001 after the 
German legislature introduced registered civil partnerships for same-sex 
couples.
12
 The partnerships law was challenged on German constitutional 
 
 
dissenting justice that the court was in reality ruling on the merits of the argument, see infra notes 33–
37 and accompanying text); Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307 (D.C. 1995) (in which a 
splintered court based its denial of same-sex marriage recognition on the reasoning that ―same-sex 
‗marriages‘ are legally and factually—i.e., definitionally—impossible,‖ id. at 361 (Terry, J., 
concurring), or that the argument need not be assessed until it was determined whether homosexuals 
constitute a suspect, quasi-suspect, or non-suspect class, id. at 333–34 (Ferren, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part)); Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, 21 P.3d 357, 360 (Alaska 2001) (ignoring 
the trial court‘s reasoning in the course of the trial that the traditional institution argument was 
judicially assessable, including that ―[i]t is not enough to say that ‗marriage is marriage‘ and accept 
without any scrutiny the law before the court,‖ 1998 WL 88743, at *2 (Alaska Super. Ct. 1998), while 
finding that the case was not yet ripe for decision); Li v. State, 110 P.3d 91, 102 (Or. 2005) (striking 
down a challenge to Oregon‘s same-sex marriage ban on procedural grounds and not addressing the 
form of the traditional institution argument that was raised in the trial court: ―Intervenors-defendants 
argue that ‗traditional marriage—marriage between one man and one woman—would clearly be a 
historical exception to any reading of Article I, Section 20 that would invalidate the marriage statutes, 
then or now,‘‖ 2004 WL 1258167, at *7 (Or. Cir. 2004)); Andersen v. King Cnty., 138 P.3d 963, 983 
(Wash. 2006) (criticizing a concurring opinion‘s reliance on the traditional institution argument as one 
of many ―unassailable truths‖ and relying on prohibitions on judicial review of the merits of legislative 
action to avoid addressing the argument). In De Santo v. Barnsley, 476 A.2d 952 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984), 
the Superior Court of Pennsylvania declined to rule on a state Equal Rights Amendment challenge to 
the State‘s refusal to recognize same-sex common-law marriages, but it did so because the argument 
had not been raised in the lower courts. Id. at 956. Although it is an equal protection-type challenge to 
a state‘s non-recognition of same-sex marriages, the De Santo holding is expressly restricted to 
common-law (non-statutory) marriages and thus is not relevant for comparison with the other cases. 
Id. at 953. But see id. at 954 (assuming that ―marriage‖ retains its usual meaning even when referring 
to a common-law marriage). See also Baehr, 852 P.2d at 61 (holding that the restriction of the De 
Santo holding to common-law marriages rendered it irrelevant to the issue of whether Hawaii‘s denial 
of same-sex marriage recognition was constitutional). 
 11. This Note cites and provides translations for several German legal texts. The English 
translations of the German Federal Constitutional Court [BVerfG] decisions reported at 105 BVERFGE 
313 (decided on July 17, 2002) and 124 BVERFGE 199 (decided on July 7, 2009) are quoted (with 
Americanized spelling) from English translations available at the Court‘s website, http://www. 
bundesverfassungsgericht.de/en. The same is true of the names of the German statutes cited in this 
Note. The translations of the other Federal Constitutional Court decisions, the German law journal 
articles, and the Act for the Revision of the Law of Civil Partnerships quoted in note 78 are the 
author‘s own translations. Translation is an art, not a science, and there will inevitably be subtle 
changes in the meaning of a text when it is translated. The author has endeavored to provide a clear 
and accurate translation of the original German texts, and believes that the translations provided by the 
Federal Constitutional Court are both clear and accurate. Any errors in translation are, of course, the 
author‘s own responsibility. 
 12. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] July 17, 2002, 105 
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 313 (313) (describing the 
enactment of the Gesetz zur Beendigung der Diskriminierung gleichgeschlechtlicher Gemeinschaften: 
Lebenspartnerschaften [Act on the Termination of the Discrimination of Same-Sex Couples: Civil 
Partnerships], Feb. 16, 2001, BGBL. I at 266). As in Vermont (until the passage of the same-sex 
marriage recognition bill in 2009) and New Jersey, the German legislature established a parallel 
institution to marriage with a different name, rather than establishing legal recognition of same-sex 
marriages per se. See 2009 Vt. Adv. Legis. Serv. 3 (LexisNexis); 2006 N.J. Laws 103. However, the 
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grounds.
13
 The German Constitution (entitled ―Basic Law‖) requires the 
government to affirmatively support the institution of marriage,
14
 and the 
challenge to the partnerships law claimed that legal recognition of any 
form of cohabitation other than a marriage between one man and one 
woman would undermine the traditional institution of marriage.
15
 The 
German Federal Constitutional Court, which is the court of final 
jurisdiction for constitutional questions,
16
 considered the argument in 
detail and concluded that the legal recognition of same-sex unions did not 
undermine the traditional institution of marriage.
17
 In a dissenting opinion, 
one judge argued that the constitutionally required guarantee of the 
institution of marriage required the State to privilege the institution of 
marriage above all other forms of cohabitation.
18
 However, the Federal 
 
 
traditional institution argument as raised in opposition to registered partnerships is identical to the 
argument as raised in opposition to same-sex marriages, so the judicial treatments of the argument 
permit a comparison. In many contexts, German life partnerships and German civil marriages are 
simply treated as if they were one institution. The word Homoehe [―gay marriage‖] is used in Germany 
to describe life partnerships. See Weitere Gleichstellung für Homosexuelle [Greater Equality for 
Homosexuals], ONLINE FOCUS (Oct. 22, 2009), http://www.focus.de/politik/weitere-meldungen/ 
bundesverfassungsgericht-weitere-gleichstellung-fuer-homosexuelle_aid_447007.html (referring to 
registered partnerships as ―sogenannte[] Homoehe‖ [―so-called gay marriage‖]). 
 13. See infra note 15. 
 14. See GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GRUNDGESETZ] [GG] [BASIC 
LAW], May 23, 1949, BGBL. I, art. 6.1 (Ger.) (―Ehe und Familie stehen unter dem besonderen Schutz 
der staatlichen Ordnung.‖ [―Marriage and family have the special protection of the state.‖]). See also 
BVerfG, 105 BVERFGE 313 (342) (―[Das] neue[] Institut[] der eingetragenen Lebenspartnerschaft . . . 
verst[ößt] weder gegen die in Art. 6 Abs. 1 GG gewährleistete Eheschließungsfreiheit noch gegen die 
dort normierte Institutsguarantie.‖ [―The new institution . . . infringe[s] neither the freedom of 
marriage guaranteed in Article 6.1 of the Basic Law nor the institutional guarantee laid down there.‖]).  
 15. 105 BVERFGE at 321. The challenge to the law claimed that ―[i]nsbesondere stehe es mit 
dem nach Art. 6 Abs. 1 GG gebotenen Schutz von Ehe und Familie nicht in Einklang.‖ [―In particular, 
[the law] is not consistent with the protection of marriage and the family required by Article 6.1 of the 
Basic Law.‖] The challenge to the law also included an allegation that the procedure by which the law 
was enacted violated the constitution. Id. at 318–19. That basis for the challenge was unanimously 
rejected by the court. See infra note 67. 
 16. GG art. 1.3. See also Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz [Federal Constitutional Court Act], 
Mar. 12, 1951, BGBL. I at 244–245, §§ 13–14, repromulgated Aug. 11, 1993, BGBL. I at 1473, repro 
last amended by Gesetz, Dec. 22, 2010, BGBL. I at 2248, art. 11. 
 17. BVerfG, 105 BVERFGE 313 (343–57). 
 18. ―Förderung bedeutet positive Zuwendung über das normale Maß hinaus, damit also 
Privilegierung der Ehe.‖ [―Promotion means positive consideration beyond the normal degree, and 
therefore giving marriage privileged treatment.‖] (Richterin [Judge] Haas, dissenting). Id. at 361. The 
Federal Constitutional Court has continued to interpret this provision and, contrary to the arguments of 
Judge Haas, has limited the ability of the State to privilege marriages over domestic partnerships. 
―Geht jedoch die Förderung der Ehe mit einer Benachteiligung anderer Lebensformen einher, obgleich 
diese nach dem geregelten Lebenssachverhalt und den mit der Normierung verfolgten Zielen der Ehe 
vergleichbar sind, rechtfertigt die bloße Verweisung auf das Schutzgebot der Ehe eine solche 
Differenzierung nicht.‖ [―Although the support of marriage is associated with a disadvantage to other 
living arrangements, notwithstanding that they are comparable to marriage in the regulations they are 
subject to and in the ends that they are normally understood to serve, a mere referral to the 
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Constitutional Court has since rejected this argument
19
 and mandated that 
all the substantive rights extended to married couples be extended equally 
to those in registered civil partnerships, except in situations where the 
government can show a justifiable reason to treat the institutions 
differently.
20
 
 
 
constitutional principle of protecting marriage does not justify such a different treatment [in reference 
to German inheritance tax law].‖] BVerfG, 1 BvR 611/07, ¶ 91, July 21, 2010. 
 19. ―Es ist verfassungsrechtlich nicht begründbar, aus dem besonderen Schutz der Ehe 
abzuleiten, dass andere Lebensgemeinschaften im Abstand zur Ehe auszugestalten und mit geringeren 
Rechten zu versehen sind.‖ [―It cannot be constitutionally justified to derive from the special 
protection of marriage a rule that other partnerships are to be structured in a way different from 
marriage and to be given lesser rights.‖] Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional 
Court], July 7, 2009, 124 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 199 
(226). 
 20. ―Art. 3 Abs. 1 GG gebietet, dass hinsichtlich der Ungleichbehandlung an ein sachlich 
gerechtfertigtes Unterscheidungsmerkmal angeknüpft wird.‖ [―Article 3.1 of the Basic Law requires 
that the unequal treatment must be linked to a factually justified distinguishing element.‖] Id. at 220. 
―Die Ungleichbehandlung von Ehe und eingetragener Lebenspartnerschaft ist gemessen an diesen 
Anforderungen nicht gerechtfertigt.‖ [―The unequal treatment of marriage and registered civil 
partnerships is not justified, measured against these requirements.‖] Id. at 224. ―Ein sachlicher 
Differenzierungsgrund ist auch objektiv nicht erkennbar.‖ [―Nor is an objective reason for 
differentiation discernible.‖] Id.  
Die Rechtfertigung der Privilegierung der Ehe, und zwar auch der kinderlosen Ehe, liegt, 
insbesondere wenn man sie getrennt vom Schutz der Familie betrachtet, in der auf Dauer 
übernommenen, auch rechtlich verbindlichen Verantwortung für den Partner. In diesem Punkt 
unterschieden sich eingetragene Lebenspartnerschaft und Ehe aber nicht. Beide sind auf 
Dauer angelegt und begründen eine gegenseitige Einstandspflicht. 
[The justification of the privileged treatment of marriage, even where it is childless, in 
particular when it is considered separately from the protection of the family, lies in the 
responsibility for the partner which is assumed in the long term and which is also legally 
binding. In this respect, however, there is no difference between registered civil partnerships 
and marriage. Both are of a permanent nature and create a mutual obligation of support.] 
Id. at 225. Prior to the court‘s 2009 decision, at least one German legal commentator had insisted that 
although ―marriage‖ had shifted in meaning over time, its constitutional definition retained essential 
attributes of opposite-sex spouses and indissolubility (immunity from institutional abolishment by the 
government, not immunity from dissolution by divorce), and that this justified a privileged status for 
opposite-sex marriage. Martin Burgi, Schützt das Grundgesetz die Ehe von der Konkurrenz anderer 
Lebensgemeinschaften? [Does the Basic Law Protect Marriage from Competition from Other Forms of 
Cohabitation?], 39 DER STAAT 487 (2000). ―Die Ehe ist in der Realität nicht mehr das, was sie im 
Zeitpunkt des Inkrafttretens des Grundgesetzes gewesen ist . . . .‖ [―The institution of marriage is in 
reality no longer the thing that it was at the time of the enactment of the Constitution . . . .‖] Id. at 488. 
―Unabdingbare inhaltliche Mindestvoraussetzungen einer Ehe im Sinne des Grundgesetzes sind mithin 
die Verschiedengeschlechtlichkeit und die grundsätzliche Unauflöslichkeit.‖ [―Hence the presence of 
both sexes and constitutional indissolubility are indispensable minimum prerequisites of a marriage in 
the constitutional sense.‖] Id. at 491. ―[A]n welche Form der Lebensgemeinschaft die berührten 
Gemeinwohlinteressen gebunden sind, nämlich an die Ehe. Sie entspricht einer Wertentscheidung des 
Grundgesetzes, das ihr den Vorrang gegenüber anderen Lebensgemeinschaften einräumt.‖ [―[T]he 
form of cohabitation with which the common good is connected, which is marriage. This reflects a 
normative judgment of the Constitution that gives marriage priority over other forms of cohabitation.‖] 
Id. at 508. However, prior to the decision, other commentators had argued that the constitutionally 
mandated protection of marriage did not require other living arrangements to be given an inferior 
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While the issue may be more settled in Germany, the legal recognition 
of same-sex marriages (and other parallel institutions)
21
 remains one of the 
hottest controversies in American politics,
22
 and equal protection 
challenges to same-sex marriage bans continue to be raised in American 
courts.
23
 The political nature of the controversy raises difficult questions 
about the appropriate scope of judicial intervention in the area, especially 
when courts are confronted with the politically charged claim that the 
traditional institution of marriage is threatened by the legal recognition of 
same-sex marriages. This Note will conduct a brief overview of the ways 
in which American courts have dealt with the traditional institution 
argument. It will then address in some detail the approach of the German 
 
 
status. ―Eine Ausschließlichkeitsfunktion des Art.6 Abs.1 GG besteht im übrigen bereits faktisch 
nicht.‖ [―There is not in fact an exclusionary function of Article 6.1 of the Basic Law.‖] Gerhard 
Robbers, Eingetragene Lebenspartnerschaften: Verfassungsrechtliche Überlegungen [Registered Civil 
Partnerships: Constitutional Considerations], 56 JURISTENZEITUNG 779, 782 (2001). ―Solange der 
Gesetzgeber in den Kernbestand der die Ehe regelnden Normen nicht eingreift, steht die 
Institutsguarantie vielmehr selbst einem Rechtsinstitut nicht entgegen, das die eherechtlichen 
Vorschriften vollinhaltlich kopiert.‖ [―As long as the legislature does not interfere with the core of the 
legal norms that affect marriage, the institutional guarantee in itself is especially not a bar to another 
legal institution that fully copies the regulatory scheme of marriage.‖] Johannes Wasmuth, Zur 
Verfassungsmässigkeit der eingetragenen Lebenspartnerschaft [On the Constitutionality of Registered 
Civil Partnerships], 41 DER STAAT 47, 54 (2002). 
 21. For the controversies surrounding other legal recognition of same-sex couples, consider 
―marriage amendments‖ that ban not only recognition of same-sex marriages, but also sharply limit or 
entirely forbid lesser forms of legal recognition for same-sex couples. Such amendments have passed 
whenever brought to voters, except in the 2006 Arizona ballot. See infra note 52. Despite the 
successful passage of such amendments, polls from 2009–2011 suggest that significantly more 
Americans favor at least some legal recognition for same-sex couples than favor no recognition. See 
Stephanie Condon, Poll: Support for Gay Marriage Dips, CBS NEWS, June 17, 2009, 
http://www.cbsnews.com/blogs/2009/06/17/politics/politicalhotsheet/entry5094597.shtml; Jennifer 
Agiesta, Post-ABC Poll: Views on Gay Marriage Steady, More Back Civil Unions, WASH. POST, Feb. 
12, 2010, http://voices.washingtonpost.com/behind-the-numbers/2010/02/post-abc_poll_views_on_ 
gay_mar.html?wprss=behind-the-numbers; Gary Langer, Support for Gay Marriage Reaches a 
Milestone, ABC NEWS, Mar. 18, 2011, http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/support-gay-marriage-reaches-
milestone/story?id=13159608. 
 22. For example, the 2008 voter referendum to amend California‘s constitution to prevent 
recognition of same-sex marriage involved $83 million total fundraising, making it ―the most 
expensive ballot measure on a social issue in the nation‘s history.‖ Lisa Leff, Donors Pumped $83M to 
Calif. Gay Marriage Campaign, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 2, 2009, http://www.foxnews.com/wires/ 
2009Feb02/0,4670,GayMarriageMoney,00.html; see also infra note 52. 
 23. The most prominent challenge was a Fourteenth Amendment challenge to California‘s 2008 
voter-enacted ban on same-sex marriage, commonly known as Proposition 8. Perry v. 
Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 927 (N.D. Cal. 2010). The federal complaint was filed after the 
Supreme Court of California upheld the ban under the California Constitution. See Strauss v. Horton, 
207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009). For other recently raised challenges to same-sex marriage bans under other 
provisions of the Federal Constitution, see infra note 103. As of this writing, Perry is on appeal to the 
Ninth Circuit, which has certified a question of standing under California state law to the Supreme 
Court of California. The Ninth Circuit is waiting to receive an answer from the California court. Perry 
v. Schwarzenegger, 628 F.3d 1191, 1193–94 (9th Cir. 2011). 
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Federal Constitutional Court to the same argument. This Note concludes 
that the German judicial approach of providing a clearly explained, logical 
analysis of the traditional institution argument is an appropriate and 
desirable way for American courts to address the argument. However, this 
Note does not advocate a particular conclusion that courts should reach 
regarding the argument‘s merits. 
I. APPROACHES BY AMERICAN COURTS TO THE TRADITIONAL 
INSTITUTION ARGUMENT 
The first equal protection challenge to a same-sex marriage ban was 
heard by the Supreme Court of Minnesota in the 1971 case Baker v. 
Nelson.
24
 The court did not directly address the traditional institution 
argument, but upheld the State‘s denial of a marriage license to the two 
petitioners against a challenge under the Federal Equal Protection Clause, 
although it was undisputed that the sole reason for the denial was that they 
were of the same sex.
25
 The next year, the Supreme Court of the United 
States dismissed the petitioners‘ appeal ―for want of a substantial federal 
question.‖26 This dismissal ―for want of a substantial federal question‖ has 
been recognized by several courts to constitute a binding Supreme Court 
ruling that the Federal Equal Protection Clause permits states to refuse to 
recognize same-sex marriages while recognizing opposite-sex marriages.
27
 
 
 
 24. Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971); see also supra note 3. 
 25. Baker, 191 N.W.2d at 185; see also supra note 3. 
 26. See Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972). 
 27. See, e.g., Adams v. Howerton, 486 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (C.D. Cal. 1980); McConnell v. 
Nooner, 547 F.2d 54, 55–56 (8th Cir. 1976); Lockyer v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 95 P.3d 459, 504–05 
(Cal. 2004) (Kennard, J., dissenting); Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15, 19–20 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005); 
Wilson v. Ake, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1304–05 (M.D. Fla. 2005); Andersen v. King Cnty., 138 P.3d 
963, 1000 (Wash. 2006) (Johnson, J., concurring); Def.‘s Mot. to Dismiss at 29, Smelt v. United 
States, No. 09-00286, dismissed (C.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 2009), 2009 WL 1683906 (―The decision in Baker 
has precedential effect and is binding here. As the Supreme Court has explained, a dismissal for lack 
of a substantial federal question is a decision on the merits.‖) (internal citations omitted). But see 
Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 9 (N.Y. 2006) (rejecting the argument that Baker prevented the 
court from considering a challenge under New York‘s Equal Protection Clause, although New York 
interprets its Equal Protection Clause as coextensive with the Federal Equal Protection Clause). 
Plaintiffs have occasionally argued that Baker should not apply because of subsequent social and legal 
developments affecting sexual orientation, such as Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (invalidating 
under the Federal Equal Protection Clause a state constitutional amendment that banned any legal 
protections for homosexuals or bisexuals as a class), or Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) 
(invalidating the State‘s criminalization of consensual sexual conduct between adults of the same sex 
under the Federal Due Process Clause). However, at least one federal court has specifically rejected 
the argument that these subsequent developments affect Baker‘s status as binding precedent. Wilson, 
354 F. Supp. 2d at 1304–05. Despite these holdings, the United States District Court for the Northern 
District of California heard Perry v. Schwarzenegger, a case challenging that State‘s same-sex 
marriage ban under the Federal Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses. See supra note 23. 
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In the next two years, Kentucky and Washington state courts heard 
challenges to denials of same-sex marriage recognition under their state 
constitutions, and both courts upheld the denials.
28
 
The next state court consideration of a challenge to the denial of same-
sex marriage recognition took place in Hawaii in 1993.
29
 In Baehr v. 
Lewin, the Supreme Court of Hawaii did not require the State to recognize 
same-sex marriages,
30
 but it did find that the denial of marriage licenses to 
same-sex couples constituted sex discrimination,
31
 and remanded to the 
lower courts for further proceedings.
32
 This decision was significant 
because it was the first time that the highest court of any state treated the 
traditional institution argument as being within its competence to assess.  
However, one dissenting justice did not agree that the argument was 
judicially assessable, arguing that there was ―no question‖ that the 
maintenance of the traditional institution of marriage was a legitimate state 
 
 
Although the proponents of the ban argued that they were entitled to summary judgment against the 
plaintiffs because Baker was controlling precedent, Def.-Intervenors‘ Mot. for Summ. J. at 13, Perry v. 
Schwarzenegger, 2010 WL 3170286 (Oct. 14, 2009) (―Baker is binding precedent and requires this 
Court to dismiss Plaintiffs‘ claims as a matter of law.‖), the court denied the motion for summary 
judgment on the grounds that Baker had been eroded by subsequent doctrinal developments and did 
not address the same issues that were raised by the plaintiffs‘ challenge to Proposition 8. Tr. at 75–79, 
Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 2010 WL 3170286 (Oct. 14, 2009). See Vikram David Amar, Should 
Summary Judgment Have Been Granted in the Federal Proposition 8 Suit? Part One, FINDLAW, Oct. 
23, 2009, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/amar/20091023.html; Vikram David Amar, Should Summary 
Judgment Have Been Granted in the Federal Proposition 8 Suit? Part Two, FINDLAW, Nov. 6, 2009, 
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/amar/20091106.html (arguing that it was appropriate for the court to 
deny summary judgment both because the Minnesota statute at issue in Baker and the California 
constitutional provision at issue in Perry are materially different and because part of the role of district 
courts is to develop records for the Supreme Court to use in deciding constitutional questions). The 
court did not address Baker in its opinion. See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. 
Cal. 2010). 
 28. Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588, 589 (Ky. 1973); Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1197 
(Wash. Ct. App. 1974); see also supra note 5. 
 29. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993). 
 30. ―Such a holding would . . . be premature at this time.‖ Baehr, 852 P.2d at 67. However, the 
decision was highly significant because it ―raised the possibility, for the first time, that same-sex 
couples could begin to obtain state-sanctioned marriage licenses.‖ Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. 
Supp. 2d 374, 377 (D. Mass. 2010). 
 31. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 59–60. In contrast, in its opinion upholding the German registered 
partnership law, the German Federal Constitutional Court expressly rejected the argument that the 
restrictions of marriage to opposite-sex couples and registered partnerships to same-sex couples 
constituted sex discrimination. It held instead that the restrictions were based on the gender 
combinations of the couple. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] July 
17, 2002, 105 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 313 (351–52). The 
United States District Court for the Northern District of California, on the other hand, has held that 
denying recognition of same-sex marriages was sexual orientation discrimination that was ―equivalent 
to . . . discrimination based on sex.‖ Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 996. 
 32. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 68. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
152 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 10:143 
 
 
 
 
interest that would satisfy rational basis review.
33
 That justice viewed the 
prospect of a judicial mandate of same-sex marriage recognition as 
equivalent to ―rooting out the very essence of a legal marriage,‖34 and 
argued that ―redress for [the] deprivations‖ of any statutory rights suffered 
by same-sex couples was ―a matter for the legislature.‖35 The plurality‘s 
response to these arguments was to point out that the court had not ruled 
on the constitutionality of the same-sex marriage ban, but had merely 
found that it was facially discriminatory.
36
  
However, as no doubt concerned the dissenting justice, the court had 
held that the state‘s interest in maintaining the traditional institution of 
marriage could be evaluated by courts, opening the possibility that a court 
might someday find the interest insufficient to support a same-sex 
marriage ban. The justice would have forestalled this possibility by relying 
on the reasoning of the Court of Appeals of Washington in Singer v. 
Hara,
37
 which held that the State‘s restriction of civil marriage to 
opposite-sex couples was not state action for the purposes of equal 
protection analysis.
38
 The strong national reaction to the Baehr ruling 
spurred the passage of the Federal Defense of Marriage Act in 1996.
39
 In 
1998, Hawaiian voters amended their state‘s constitution to preserve the 
legislature‘s ability to confine civil marriage to opposite-sex couples.40 
Legal challenges to same-sex marriage bans in various states and the 
District of Columbia continued after Baehr,
41
 proceeding on equal 
protection or equal protection-type challenges.
42
 None came close to 
 
 
 33. Id. at 72 (Heen, J., dissenting). 
 34. Id. at 74. 
 35. Id.  
 36. Id. at 67 (plurality opinion). 
 37. Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974); see supra note 7 and accompanying 
text. 
 38. ―[A]ppellants are not being denied entry into the marriage relationship because of their sex; 
rather . . . because of the recognized definition of that relationship as one which may be entered into 
only by two persons . . . of the opposite sex.‖ Baehr, 852 P.2d at 71 (quoting Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 
at 1191–92). But see Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971); Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 
588 (Ky. 1973); Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307 (D.C. 1995). 
 39. See supra note 2. 
 40. ―The legislature shall have the power to reserve marriage to opposite-sex couples.‖ HAW. 
CONST. art. I, § 23. 
 41. See supra notes 7–10. 
 42. The constitutions of Vermont and Oregon do not have equal protection clauses per se. They 
have, respectively, ―common benefits‖ and ―equality of privileges and immunities‖ constitutional 
provisions that perform the legal functions of equal protection clauses. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 
869–70 (Vt. 1999); Li v. Oregon, 110 P.3d 91, 96 (Or. 2005) (clarifying that the challenge was brought 
under Art. I Section 20 of that state‘s constitution); see VT. CONST. ch. 1, art. 7; OR. CONST. art. I, 
§ 20. 
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success until the 1999 Vermont case Baker v. State.
43
 In Baker, the 
Supreme Court of Vermont held that the legislature was constitutionally 
required to either include same-sex couples in the institution of civil 
marriage or find another way to provide them with identical substantive 
benefits.
44
 In response, the legislature created a parallel institution of ―civil 
unions‖ in 2000,45 but in 2009, it granted full recognition to same-sex 
marriages instead.
46
 Vermont thus became the first state to recognize 
same-sex marriages through legislative, rather than judicial, action.
47
 
The first successful judicial challenge to a state‘s same-sex marriage 
ban was the 2003 Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts ruling in 
Goodridge v. Department of Public Health.
48
 In Goodridge, the court 
considered the argument that the legal recognition of same-sex marriages 
would threaten the traditional institution of marriage, but held that the 
argument contained ―circular reasoning.‖49 As the court acknowledged in 
its opinion, the ruling was highly controversial.
50
 In the five years 
following Goodridge, the number of states with constitutional 
amendments preventing courts (and, with the exception of Hawaii, 
legislatures)
51
 from establishing same-sex marriage recognition jumped 
from four to thirty.
52
 
 
 
 43. 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999). 
 44. Id. at 887. 
 45. 2000 Vt. Acts & Resolves 72. 
 46. See supra note 12. 
 47. Abby Goodnough, Gay Rights Groups Celebrate Victories in Marriage Push, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 7, 2009, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/08/us/08vermont.html. 
 48. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
 49. Id. at 961–62 n.23. 
 50. ―Many people hold deep-seated religious, moral, and ethical convictions that marriage should 
be limited to the union of one man and one woman, and that homosexual conduct is immoral.‖ Id. at 
948. 
 51. HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23. The Hawaii amendment is unique in that it simply reserves the 
power to determine whether to recognize same-sex marriage for the legislature. All the other marriage 
amendments prevent both courts and legislatures from establishing same-sex marriage recognition. See 
infra note 52. 
 52. Prior to Goodridge, four states had enacted marriage amendments: Alaska, Hawaii, 
Nebraska, and Nevada. Between 2004 and 2008, twenty-six additional states enacted marriage 
amendments: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, 
Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, 
Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Wisconsin. See ALA. 
CONST. art. I, § 36.03; ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 25; ARIZ. CONST. art. XXX, § 1; ARK. CONST. amend. 
83, § 1; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 31; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 27; GA. CONST. art. 
I, § IV ¶ 1; HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23; IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 28; KAN. CONST. art. 15, § 16; KY. 
CONST. § 233a; LA. CONST. art. XII, § 15; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 25; MISS. CONST. art. 14, § 263A; 
MO. CONST. art. I, § 33; MONT. CONST. art. XIII, § 7; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 29; NEV. CONST. art. I, 
§ 21; N.D. CONST. art. XI, § 28; OH. CONST. art. XV, § 11; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 35; OR. CONST. 
art. XV, § 5a; S.C. CONST. art. XVII, § 15; S.D. CONST. art. XXI, § 9; TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 18; 
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In 2008, the Supreme Courts of California
53
 and Connecticut
54
 held that 
their states‘ constitutions required the legal recognition of same-sex 
marriage. Both courts found that the traditional institution argument was 
not persuasive. In California, the proponents of the traditional institution 
argument relied on the works of the philosopher John Rawls, who 
―state[d] that one of the essential functions of the family ‗is to establish the 
orderly production and reproduction of society and of its culture from one 
generation to the next.‘‖55 The court, however, found that the quoted text 
actually suggested that same-sex marriage recognition would not 
undermine traditional marriage: ―Rawls proceeds to observe that in his 
view, ‗no particular form of the family (monogamous, heterosexual, or 
otherwise) is so far required by a political conception of justice so long as 
it is arranged to fulfill these tasks effectively and does not run afoul of 
other political values.‘‖56 The Connecticut court relied on Justice Scalia‘s 
more blunt approach to the traditional institution argument: ―Without 
sound justification for denying same sex [sic] couples the right to marry, it 
therefore may be true, as Justice Scalia has asserted, that ‗preserving the 
traditional institution of marriage‘ is just a kinder way of describing the 
[s]tate‘s moral disapproval of same-sex couples.‖57  
The California and Connecticut decisions were followed in 2009 by the 
Supreme Court of Iowa,
58
 which likewise found that the traditional 
 
 
TEX. CONST. art. I, § 32; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 29; VA. CONST. art. I, § 15-A; WIS. CONST. art. XIII, 
§ 13. The first attempt to amend the Arizona Constitution failed in 2006. See ARIZONA SECRETARY OF 
STATE, STATE OF ARIZONA OFFICIAL CANVASS: 2006 GENERAL ELECTION 15 (2006), available at 
http://www.azsos.gov/election/2006/General/Canvass2006GE.pdf (voting results for Proposition 107 
on marriage). The next election saw a successful attempt to amend the Arizona Constitution. See 
ARIZONA SECRETARY OF STATE, STATE OF ARIZONA OFFICIAL CANVASS: 2008 GENERAL ELECTION 
15 (2008), available at http://www.azsos.gov/election/2008/General/Canvass2008GE.pdf (voting 
results for Proposition 102 on marriage). 
 53. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008). This decision is also notable because the 
court held that, under the California Constitution, sexual orientation is a suspect classification that 
merits strict scrutiny for equal protection purposes. Id. at 442. It remains uncertain what precedential 
value the decision will have after the constitutional amendment redefining marriage in California 
solely as a union between one man and one woman. See supra notes 21–22. 
 54. Kerrigan v. Comm‘r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008). Unlike the Supreme Court 
of California, the Supreme Court of Connecticut applied intermediate scrutiny to the state‘s denial of 
same-sex marriage licenses after finding that sexual orientation is a quasi-suspect classification. Id. at 
431–32, 472–73 n.74. 
 55. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 433 n.51 (quoting JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A 
RESTATEMENT 162 (2001)). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 479 (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 601 (2003) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 58. Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009). The Iowa Supreme Court held that, because 
the state‘s denial of same-sex marriage licenses did not survive intermediate scrutiny, it was not 
necessary to decide whether strict scrutiny should be applied to sexual orientation-based 
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institution argument was not persuasive. The Iowa court held that although 
the traditional institution argument ―is straightforward and has superficial 
appeal,‖59 if courts were to accept the argument, ―equal protection analysis 
[would be] transformed into the circular question of whether the 
classification accomplishes the governmental objective, which objective 
[sic] is to maintain the classification.‖60 The court continued with a 
dismissal of the argument on the merits:  
The preservation of traditional marriage could only be a legitimate 
reason for the classification if expanding marriage to include others 
in its definition would undermine the traditional institution. The 
[appellant] has simply failed to explain how the traditional 
institution of civil marriage would suffer if same-sex civil marriage 
were allowed.
61
 
Although the California decision was overturned later in 2008 by a voter-
enacted state constitutional amendment,
62
 the Connecticut and Iowa 
rulings remain in effect. 
The decisions in Massachusetts, California, Connecticut, and Iowa all 
gave the traditional institution argument only cursory analysis before 
dismissing it. While the courts did give logical explanations for their 
dismissals of the argument, the explanations are so short that they have 
been reproduced almost fully in the text of this Note. 
II. THE GERMAN FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURT‘S APPROACH TO THE 
TRADITIONAL INSTITUTION ARGUMENT 
The traditional institution argument arose in a similar context in 
Germany in 2001. In that year, the German legislature created a system of 
registered civil partnerships (eingetragene Lebenspartnerschaft)
63
 with 
 
 
classifications. Id. at 896; cf. Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374, 387 (D. Mass. 2010) 
(holding that it was unnecessary to decide what tier of scrutiny ought to apply to sexual orientation-
based discrimination because the federal government‘s denial of same-sex marriage recognition under 
the Defense of Marriage Act did not survive rational basis review); Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. 
Supp. 2d 921, 997 (holding that, although classifications based on sexual orientation are appropriately 
subject to strict scrutiny, the state‘s denial of same-sex marriage recognition did not survive rational 
basis review). 
 59. Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 898. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 899 n.25 (emphasis in original). 
 62. See supra notes 21–22, 52 and accompanying text. 
 63. Gesetz zur Beendigung der Diskriminierung gleichgeschlechtlicher Gemeinschaften: 
Lebenspartnerschaften [Act on the Termination of the Discrimination of Same-Sex Couples: Civil 
Partnerships], Feb. 16, 2001, BGBL. I at 266. 
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many of the substantive benefits and responsibilities of civil marriage.
64
 
The registered civil partnerships law was challenged on the grounds that it 
violated Germany‘s constitutionally mandated state protection of the 
institution of marriage, as well as on the grounds that the procedure by 
which the law was enacted was unconstitutional.
65
 The Federal 
Constitutional Court, which has final jurisdiction for constitutional 
questions,
66
 considered both challenges
67
 and held that neither was a 
constitutional bar to the civil partnerships.
68
  
In the years after the court‘s ruling, the German legislature expanded 
the rights of the partnerships further to more closely match those of civil 
marriages.
69
 The court ruled in 2009 that the government is 
constitutionally required to extend the same rights to couples in registered 
partnerships as are granted to married couples, except in situations where 
the government can justify different treatment.
70
 The court noted that the 
German Constitution‘s requirement of equal treatment by the government 
precludes extending benefits to different groups of people unequally.
71
 The 
court held that the privileged status of marriage must be extended to civil 
partnerships because the justification for the privileged status of 
marriage—the legally enforceable duty of care that spouses owe to each 
other—is equally applicable to members of civil partnerships.72 
 
 
 64. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], July 17, 2002, 105 
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 313 (314–15). 
 65. See supra note 15. 
 66. See supra note 16. 
 67. For the court‘s treatment of the procedural challenge, see BVerfG, 105 BVERFGE at 318–42. 
The majority‘s holding—that the procedure by which the partnership law was enacted was 
constitutional—was not disputed by either of the two dissenting judges. See id. at 357–65 (Richter 
[Judge] Papier, dissenting and Richterin [Judge] Haas, dissenting). For the court‘s treatment of the 
argument that the legal recognition of partnerships was a threat to the traditional institution of 
marriage, see id. at 342–57. 
 68. Id. at 357. 
 69. See Gesetz zur Überarbeitung des Lebenspartnerschaftsrechts [Act for the Revision of the 
Law of Civil Partnerships], Dec. 15, 2004, BGBL. I at 3396. 
 70. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], July 7, 2009, 124 
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 199 (226). This decision is only 
retroactive to January 1, 2005. BVerfG, 1 BvR 170/06, ¶ 17, June 11, 2010. 
 71. ―Der allgemeine Gleichheitssatz (Art. 3 Abs. 1 GG) gebietet, alle Menschen vor dem Gesetz 
gleich zu behandeln. Verboten ist auch ein gleichheitswidriger Begünstigungsausschluss, bei dem eine 
Begünstigung einem Personenkreis gewährt, einem anderen Personenkreis aber vorenthalten wird.‖ 
[―The general principle of equality (Article 3.1 of the Basic Law) demands that all persons be treated 
equally before the law. It also prohibits the exclusion of favorable treatment that violates the principle 
of equality in which favorable treatment is granted to one group of persons while it is denied to 
another group of persons.‖] BVerfG, 124 BVERFGE 199 (218). 
 72. Id. at 225; see supra note 20. 
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When the court considered the traditional institution argument in 2001, 
it began by observing that the civil partnerships law did not burden the 
constitutional right of every citizen to freely choose a marital partner,
73
 
which is an essential attribute of the protection of marriage.
74
 The court 
continued by reasoning that because the civil partnerships were not 
available to opposite-sex couples, opposite-sex couples would not be 
materially influenced by the existence of partnerships in deciding whether 
to get married.
75
 The court then acknowledged a potential problem with 
the civil partnerships law: the law did not say whether it would permit an 
individual to be both married and in a separate civil partnership 
simultaneously.
76
 The court interpreted the law to mean that it was not 
possible to be in both a marriage and a partnership. The constitutionally 
mandated protection of marriage required the recognition of marriage‘s 
―personal exclusivity,‖ the court explained, which would preclude being in 
a civil partnership with one person while married to another.
77
 The court 
did not determine what would happen if a person in a partnership 
attempted to legally marry, and left the question for the legislature to 
resolve.
78
 
The court then addressed the argument that the constitutionally 
mandated protection of marriage precluded the legislature from creating 
any parallel institution.
79
 The court held that marriage was not undermined 
by the recognition of a parallel institution with some or all of the 
 
 
 73. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], July 17, 2002, 105 
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 313 (342, 344). 
 74. Id. at 342–43. 
 75. Id.; see also id. at 347 (holding that an institution for people who cannot legally marry does 
not denigrate the institution of marriage and that rights are not a zero-sum game: granting rights to 
another institution does not take away rights from marriage); id. at 350 (holding that because different 
groups of people are eligible for the two institutions, it would be constitutionally permissible to grant 
equal rights to the two groups). 
 76. Id. at 343. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 344. The court did, however, mention equitable concerns about interpreting the statute 
to mean that one party‘s subsequent marriage would dissolve an existing registered partnership 
because the other party in the partnership could be adversely affected without the benefit of statutory 
dissolution proceedings. Id. Accordingly, the court held that it would be permissible for the legislature 
to preclude people in registered partnerships from marrying. Id. at 343. The legislature later amended 
the law to clarify that a person in a registered partnership could not legally marry another person: 
―Eine Ehe darf nicht geschlossen werden, wenn zwischen einer der Personen, die die Ehe miteinander 
eingehen wollen, und einer dritten Person eine Ehe oder eine Lebenspartnerschaft besteht.‖ [―A 
marriage may not be entered into when there exists a marriage or registered partnership between one 
of the two people who want to marry each other and a third person.‖] Gesetz zur Überarbeitung des 
Lebenspartnerschaftsrechts [Act for the Revision of the Law of Civil Partnerships], Dec. 15, 2004, 
BGBL. I at 3396, art. 2, para. 2. 
 79. 105 BVERFGE at 346. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
158 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 10:143 
 
 
 
 
substantive rights of marriage, even if the parallel institution was clearly 
modeled on marriage.
80
 The court noted that a violation of the 
constitutionally mandated protection of marriage could arise if the 
legislature were to treat marriage as inferior to other forms of 
cohabitation.
81
 The court also acknowledged that the civil partnerships law 
was restricted to couples who could not legally marry, suggesting that it 
might find a constitutional violation
82
 if there were a parallel institution to 
marriage that was an alternative for those who could legally marry.
83
 
The court limited another avenue of attack under the marriage 
protection provision by holding that if certain other German laws treated 
married couples as inferior to couples in partnerships, then those laws, but 
not the partnership law, could be invalidated under the marriage protection 
provision.
84
 The court concluded its opinion by rejecting the argument 
that, because unmarried opposite-sex couples were not eligible for 
partnerships, the partnerships constituted illegal gender discrimination.
85
 
The rejection was based on the finding that opposite-sex couples and 
same-sex couples were not similarly situated in the context of legal 
recognition of their unions because the opposite-sex couples had the 
option of a legally recognized marriage.
86
 The rejection of the 
discrimination challenge is a logical complement to the court‘s decision to 
uphold the partnerships against the marriage protection clause. As the 
court noted, there might be a violation of the clause if marriages and civil 
partnerships were interchangeable options for couples who were eligible to 
marry.
87
 
 
 
 80. Id. at 346–47. 
 81. Id. at 346; see also id. at 349–50 (stating that the legislative history of the constitutional 
provision does not suggest that marriage protection requires that rights be denied to all other parallel 
institutions). But see supra note 18 and accompanying text; infra notes 91–94 and accompanying text 
(regarding the dissenting opinion of Richterin [Judge] Haas). 
 82. 105 BVERFGE at 350–51. 
 83. The court may be referring to the French Pacte Civil de Solidarité, a civil unions system 
enacted in 1999. Unlike in the German system, French unions are open to both same-sex and opposite-
sex couples, while opposite-sex couples also have the option of civil marriage. Loi 99-994 du 15 
novembre 1999 de relative au pacte civil de solidarité [Law 99-994 of November 15, 1999 on the Civil 
Pact of Solidarity], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF 
FRANCE], Nov. 16, 1999, p. 16959. Since 1999, France has experienced a decline in the rate of civil 
marriages and an increase in civil unions. See 2004 Demographic Report—Summary, NAT‘L INST. 
STATS. & ECON. STUD., http://www.insee.fr/en/themes/document.asp?reg_id=0&id=1358 (last visited 
Apr. 12, 2011). 
 84. 105 BVERFGE at 347. 
 85. Id. at 351–52. This point was disputed in the second dissenting opinion. Compare id. at 362–
63 (Richterin [Judge] Haas, dissenting), with Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 59–60 (Haw. 1993), and 
supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
 86. 105 BVERFGE at 352. 
 87. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
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Two judges filed dissenting opinions.
88
 The President of the Court
89
 
argued that the constitutional provision meant that marriage was protected 
from state interference and could not be redefined to reflect popular 
trends.
90
 In his opinion, the civil partnerships were simply marriage by 
another name, and thus, for constitutional purposes, were a redefinition of 
marriage.
91
 Both this opinion and the second dissenting opinion disagreed 
 
 
 88. 105 BVERFGE at 357, 359. 
 89. The President (Präsident) presides over the First Senate (Erster Senat) of the Federal 
Constitutional Court. Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz [Federal Constitutional Court Act], Mar. 12, 
1951, BGBL. I at 245, §§ 14–15, repromulgated Aug. 11, 1993, BGBL. I at 1473, last amended by 
Gesetz, Dec. 2, 2010, BGBL. I at 2248, art. 11. The First Senate has jurisdiction over claims that a 
government action violates basic rights. Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz § 14. The President‘s 
position as a judge is thus analogous to that of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United 
States. 
 90. BVERFGE at 357–58. The judge developed this point further in a 2002 law journal article in 
the context of an expansive criticism of German tax policies and their effects on married couples. The 
judge argued that it was inconceivable that the German Constitution prevented any change in the 
institutions of marriage and the family, because marriage as it existed at the time of the 1949 
constitutional enactment was incompatible with the mandate of gender equality. Hans-Jürgen Papier, 
Ehe und Familie in der neueren Rechtsprechung des BVerfG [Marriage and the Family in the Modern 
Jurisprudence of the Federal Constitutional Court], 55 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 2129 
(2002). 
Auf der anderen Seite kann dem Staat nicht jede Reform des Eherechts verwehrt sein, denn 
das hieße, dessen Stand von 1949 in den Rang von Verfassungsrecht zu heben und damit zu 
zementieren. Dies konnte schon deshalb vom Grundgesetz nicht gewollt sein, weil es die 
Unvereinbarkeit des damaligen Eherechts mit dem Grundgesetz hinsichtlich der 
Gleichberechtigung zwischen Mann und Frau sehr wohl erkannt hatte. 
[On the other hand it cannot be that it is forbidden for the state to make any reform to 
marriage laws, because that would elevate the 1949 status to a constitutional provision and 
thus cement it in place. This cannot have been the goal of the Basic Law, because the 
incompatibility of the then-existing marriage laws with the equal treatment of men and 
women was fully recognized.] 
Id. For other German law articles discussing how the institution of marriage has evolved as far as the 
German Constitution is concerned, see infra notes 91, 96. 
 91. 105 BVERFGE at 357–59. This point has been echoed and developed further by 
commentators who have argued that registered civil partnerships encroach on the exclusivity of 
marriage and that the protection of marriage requires the government to reserve the material core 
(―materielle Kerngehalt‖) of marriage for unions of one man and one woman. Rupert Scholz & Arnd 
Uhle, „Eingetragene Lebenspartnerschaft“ und Grundgesetz [―Registered Civil Partnerships‖ and the 
Basic Law], 54 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 393, 396–97 (2001). These commentators also 
argued that it is essential to privilege marriage over other living arrangements in order to encourage 
young people to marry—otherwise, a majority of young people might decide against marrying and 
raising families, the birthrate would fall, and the state would be destroyed by its support for individual 
freedoms. Id. at 393. However, this argument has been sharply criticized as a baseless ―dam-break 
phobia‖ (―Dammbruchphobie‖) that equal treatment of same-sex couples will encourage heterosexual 
people to engage in homosexual relationships. Manfred Bruns, Art. 6 I GG und gesetzliche Regelungen 
für gleichgeschlechtliche Lebensgemeinschaften [Article 6.1 of the Basic Law and Legal Regulatory 
Schemes for Same-Sex Cohabitation], 29 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR RECHTSPOLITIK 6, 7 (1996). 
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with the majority‘s conclusion that the marriage protection provision 
simply required the State to preserve the institution from harm.
92
 
The second dissenting opinion began by noting that the constitution did 
not prevent the legislature from providing some legal recognition for 
same-sex couples.
93
 However, like the President of the Court, the judge 
argued that the marriage protection provision sheltered the institution of 
marriage from all state interference, not just freedom from institutional 
harm.
94
 She claimed that because the purpose of marriage was to protect 
family stability, the protection of marriage required that the government 
privilege marriage above all other living arrangements,
95
 and she 
 
 
 92. 105 BVERFGE at 359–62. 
 93. Id. at 359–60. However, the dissenting judge appeared to limit what she held to be 
constitutionally permissible recognition of same-sex unions to something that is not a parallel 
institution to marriage: 
Ich stimme mit der Senatsmehrheit darin überein, dass von Verfassungs wegen nichts 
grundsätzlich gegen die Einführung einer Rechtsform der eingetragenen Lebenspartnerschaft 
für gleichgeschlechtliche Paare zu erinnern ist. Damit kann jederman (mit einigen gesetzlich 
geregelten Ausnahmen) seine Gemeinschaft mit einem Partner gleichen Geschlechts 
registrieren lassen, ohne dass zwischen diesen eine homosexuelle Beziehung besteht oder 
beabsichtigt wäre. 
[I agree with the majority . . . that there are fundamentally no constitutional objections to 
introducing a legal form of registered civil partnership for same-sex couples. In this way, 
everyone (with some exceptions governed by statute) may have his or her partnership with a 
partner of the same sex registered without a homosexual relationship existing or being 
intended between these two persons.] 
Id. 
 94. Id. at 361. 
 95. Id. at 360–61. This constitutional concern has been echoed by commentators. See, e.g., 
Rudolf Gerhard & Martin Kriele, Die „eingetragene Lebenspartnerschaft“ für gleichgeschlechtliche 
Paare: Der Gesetzgeber zwischen Schutzabstandsgebot und Gleichheitssatz [The ―Registered Civil 
Partnership‖ for Same-Sex Couples: The Legislature Between Protective Distinguishment and the 
Equality Provision], 33 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR RECHTSPOLITIK 409 (2000). ―Wenn der besondere Schutz 
der Ehe und seine Ausformung als Schutzabstandsgebot einen Sinn haben soll, so muss eine Differenz 
der Ehe zu der Intensität der rechtlichen Ausgestaltung einer gleichgeschlechtlichen Partnerschaft 
erkennbar sein.‖ [―If the special protection of marriage and its manifestation as protective 
distinguishment are to have meaning, there must be a cognizable difference in the intensity of the legal 
rights structures of marriage and registered partnerships.‖] Id. at 413. The majority in the court 
rejected this argument on the grounds that because registered partnerships were not open to opposite-
sex couples who were eligible to marry, it was constitutionally permissible to extend equal rights to the 
partnerships because couples who could marry would not be discouraged from marrying by the 
availability of partnerships. See supra notes 75, 81–83 and accompanying text. This method of dealing 
with the argument that protecting marriage requires that it be given a legally privileged status does not 
immediately extend to disputes over same-sex marriage recognition because it assumes the existence 
of two parallel institutions where couples are only eligible for one institution or the other. However, 
the approach is instructive in that it focuses on the lack of influence of extending privileged status to 
committed same-sex couples on the decisions of opposite-sex couples whether to enter into a civil 
marriage. Perhaps, in American equal protection challenges to same-sex marriage bans, it would be 
appropriate for courts to respond to the argument that protecting marriage requires associating it with 
greater privileges by asking the state to show how extending identical privileges to same-sex couples 
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emphasized that the court was wrong to dismiss a fundamental connection 
between ―marriage‖ and ―family.‖96 
III. THE APPROACH OF THE GERMAN COURT TO THE TRADITIONAL 
INSTITUTION ARGUMENT IS A USEFUL MODEL FOR  
AMERICAN COURTS TO ADOPT 
The German court approached the traditional institution argument by 
critically analyzing the argument on its merits and by articulating in detail 
its reasoning. This approach is appropriate and desirable for American 
courts dealing with the argument. The intensity of the political battles over 
same-sex marriage,
97
 including over the idea that the legal recognition of 
same-sex unions will threaten the institution of marriage, makes it 
especially important for courts that address the argument to give clear 
justifications in their decisions regarding the argument‘s merits. A 
decision on the constitutionality of same-sex marriage bans will spark 
significant disagreement regardless of a court‘s holding.98 Because of the 
inevitability of widespread disagreement, courts should take care to 
provide well-articulated justifications for their decisions. 
One response to this is to argue that courts should stay out of the issue 
entirely, as under the political question doctrine. In the landmark gay 
rights case Romer v. Evans,
99
 Justice Scalia made this argument, claiming 
that the Supreme Court had ―mistaken a Kulturkampf for a fit of spite.‖100 
However, it may be difficult for courts in many jurisdictions to justify 
 
 
would act to discourage opposite-sex couples from marrying. See supra note 91 and accompanying 
text. 
 96. 105 BVERFGE at 361–62. On the same pages of the opinion, the judge argued that the 
institutional guarantee of marriage only made sense when considered in context of the relationship 
between marriage and the family. Indeed, the same constitutional provision that requires the state to 
protect marriage also requires the state to protect the family. See supra note 14. However, one 
commentator has argued that the constitutional language of ―marriage and family‖ is not a tautology 
and does not establish a close, causal connection between the two—instead, the provision is 
appropriately interpreted as protecting two separate institutions in light of a decoupling through history 
of ―marriage‖ and ―family.‖ ―Zudem haben sich beide Begriffe auch inhaltlich im Laufe der Zeit stetig 
voneinander ‚entkoppelt‗.‖ [―The two concepts have also gradually ‗decoupled‘ themselves in their 
natures with the passage of time.‖] Volker Beck, Die verfassungsrechtliche Begründung der 
Eingetragenen Lebenspartnerschaft [The Constitutional Foundation of Registered Civil Partnerships], 
54 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 1894, 1897 (2001). The Federal Constitutional Court 
appeared to implicitly adopt this position in 2009. See supra note 20. 
 97. See supra note 2. 
 98. For public opinion polls showing that no one position on same-sex marriage recognition can 
avoid rejection by a significant portion of the population, see supra note 21.  
 99. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
 100. Id. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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abstention, because cases involving the legal recognition of same-sex 
marriages uniformly involve claims that constitutional rights have been 
violated. Many courts have an established tradition of reviewing 
government action under constitutional challenges despite political 
controversy surrounding the issue, such as in racial discrimination cases. 
Courts choosing to abstain must draw a principled distinction between past 
political controversies and the present political controversy surrounding 
same-sex marriage. 
The controversial aspect of same-sex marriage decisions demonstrates 
a basic problem of judicial legitimacy. In jurisdictions with appointed 
judiciaries, a controversial judicial decision may raise complaints of 
judicial activism and a lack of judicial accountability. And jurisdictions 
with elected judiciaries, though less vulnerable to criticisms of judicial 
unaccountability, may still have to face questions of judicial legitimacy if 
they are perceived as bowing to popular pressure. Because decisions 
affecting same-sex marriage recognition are likely to be strongly 
supported and opposed by a deeply divided public, each decision has the 
potential to inspire claims of either improper majoritarian control or 
undemocratic minority influence on the judiciary.
101
 
 
 
 101. It is difficult to draw a conclusion on how the prospect of re-election may have affected how 
courts deal with the traditional institution argument, because few courts with life tenure have had 
occasion to deal with the issue. Federal Article III courts, with the exceptions of the United States 
District Courts for the Northern District of California and Massachusetts (e.g., Perry v. 
Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010) and Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. 
Supp. 2d 374 (D. Mass. 2010), have held that the issue is precluded by the Supreme Court‘s dismissal 
of appeal in Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972). See supra note 3. The Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts, on which justices enjoy life tenure until age seventy, MASS. CONST. part II, ch. 3, art. 1, 
dismissed the argument, see supra note 10. In the Supreme Court of New Jersey, justices must be 
reappointed after an initial seven-year term, but thereafter enjoy life tenure until age seventy. N.J. 
CONST. art. VI, § 6(3). At the time of that court‘s decision in Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 
2006), none of the four justices who avoided addressing the traditional institution argument (Justices 
Albin, LaVecchia, Wallace, and Rivera-Soto) had life tenure. Of the three justices who were willing to 
address the argument (Justices Long and Zazzali and Chief Justice Poritz), one had life tenure, one was 
granted life tenure between oral arguments (Feb. 15, 2006) and the announcement of the court‘s 
decision (Oct. 25, 2006), and, in the same time period, the third justice was nominated and confirmed 
as the next chief justice. However, it is entirely possible that the majority simply declined to address 
the argument because the State had not raised it before the trial court. 908 A.2d at 217. For the 
confirmation dates of Justices Albin, LaVecchia, Long, Rivera-Soto, and Wallace, see Supreme Court 
of New Jersey, NEW JERSEY COURTS, http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/supreme/index.htm (last visited 
Apr. 12, 2011). For the confirmation date of Chief Justice Poritz, see Chief Justice Deborah T. Poritz 
Retires Departs from a Strong and More Efficient Judiciary, NEW JERSEY COURTS, Oct. 25, 2006, 
http://www.judiciary. state.nj.us/pressrel/2006/pr061025b.htm. For the confirmation date of then-
Justice Zazzali, see 2007–2008 N.J. CTS. ANN. REP., at 3, available at http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/ 
pressrel/ARNJCourts 08.pdf. 
 Among courts without life tenure that have dealt with the traditional institution argument, those in 
jurisdictions where judges face retention elections were more likely to accept the argument than courts 
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Courts would thus be well served by including clearly articulated 
logical explanations of their decisions in same-sex marriage cases, 
especially with assessments of the politically charged argument that same-
sex marriage recognition threatens the traditional institution of marriage. 
By including in their opinions detailed analyses of the merits and failings 
of the traditional institution argument, courts may demonstrate to those 
who disagree with their rulings the legitimate reasons behind the 
decisions. The German Federal Constitutional Court exemplified this 
approach by systematically addressing the facets and nuances of the 
traditional institution argument in detail and providing clear explanations 
for its reasoning. In an examination of the Federal Constitutional Court‘s 
tradition of originalist constitutional interpretation, Professor Mary Ann 
Glendon has written that this is not unique to the cases dealing with the 
recognition of same-sex unions: ―The Bundesverfassungsgericht [Federal 
Constitutional Court] displays impressive skill in . . . explaining the 
outcomes of particular cases in ways that can make sense even to the 
losers and others who disagree.‖102 
Importantly, by providing clearly explained analyses in their rulings, 
American courts may defend against or even avoid attacks on their 
legitimacy. Those questioning the legitimacy of courts would have the 
additional obstacle of justifying why the reasons given by the courts for 
 
 
in states where judges face legislative reappointment. Of the ten states with retention elections 
(Alaska, Arizona, California, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Minnesota, Oregon, and 
Washington), four accepted the argument. See Standhart v. Superior Court, 77 P.3d 451 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. 2003); Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005); Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 
571 (Md. 2007); Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974) (in a later case, Andersen v. 
King Cnty., 138 P.3d 963 (Wash. 2006), the Washington Supreme Court would avoid the argument). 
However, of the six jurisdictions with legislative reappointment (Connecticut, Washington, D.C., 
Hawaii, New Jersey, New York, and Vermont), only New York accepted the argument. See Hernandez 
v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 2006). For the laws governing judicial appointment or election 
schemes, see ALASKA CONST. art. IV, § 6; ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-101 (LexisNexis 2009); CAL. 
CONST. art. VI, § 16; CONN. CONST. art. V, § 2; D.C. CODE § 1-204.31, 33 (LexisNexis 2009); HAW. 
CONST. art. VI, § 3; IND. CONST. art. VII, § 11; IOWA CONST. art. V, § 17; KY. CONST. arts. 117–19; 
MD. CONST. art. IV, § 5A(f); MASS. CONST. part II, ch. 3; MINN. STAT. ANN. ch. 114, § 12 (West 
1976) (reflecting the Minnesota Constitution as it was in force at the time of the Baker v. Nelson 
decision); MINN. CONST. art. VI, § 8 (current); N.J. CONST. art. VI, § 6, ¶ 3; N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 2; 
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, §§ 3–5 (2009); WASH. REV. CODE § 2.06.070 (2009). The possibility of 
majoritarian influence on election judiciaries deciding same-sex marriage cases is real. After the 
Supreme Court of Iowa‘s unanimous decision in Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009), 
which required that state to recognize same-sex marriages, the three justices who were subject to 
retention elections the next year were removed from office. See IOWA SECRETARY OF STATE‘S OFFICE, 
OFFICIAL RESULTS REPORT: 2010 GENERAL ELECTION 1–15, available at http://www.sos.state.ia.us/ 
pdfs/elections/2010/judicialorr.pdf (describing the results of the 2010 retention elections of Justices 
Baker and Streit and Chief Justice Ternus). 
 102. Mary Ann Glendon, Comment, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND 
THE LAW 95, 110 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997). 
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their decisions are not legitimate. This in turn may help courts preserve 
their autonomy, because courts that are perceived to be legitimate are less 
likely to be subject to attempts to undermine their autonomy. Of course, 
the justifications that courts provide in their opinions may not be read by 
most members of the public. Still, they may enter the political debate all 
the same through commentators, political figures, and anyone else inclined 
to discuss judicial decisions. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
With the ongoing controversy surrounding same-sex marriage 
recognition, it is likely that the traditional institution argument will 
continue to be used in social, political, and legal battles. This will provide 
opportunities for courts to decide how they will assess the traditional 
institution argument. Since 2010 there have been several lawsuits in 
federal courts involving the legal recognition of same-sex marriages, and 
at least two of those cases have invoked the traditional institution 
argument.
103
 And future legal battles may not be restricted to federal 
courts. Cases challenging state denials of same-sex marriage recognition 
have even been heard in the courts of states with constitutional 
amendments that are intended to resolve the issue.
104
 Courts hearing these 
 
 
 103. See, e.g., Def.‘s Mot. to Dismiss, Smelt v. United States, No. 09-00286 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 
2009), 2009 WL 1683906 (see supra note 27 and accompanying text); Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 
699 F. Supp. 2d 374 (D. Mass. 2010); Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep‘t of Health and Human Servs., 698 
F. Supp. 2d 234 (D. Mass. 2010); Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (see 
supra note 23 and accompanying text for a discussion of the ongoing appeal of Perry). Although Smelt 
has been dismissed, the dismissal was without prejudice because it was solely on procedural grounds. 
See Order Granting Def.‘s Mot. to Dismiss passim, Smelt v. United States, No. 09-00286 (C.D. Cal. 
Aug. 24, 2009). 
 104. Texas, like many states, has a ―marriage amendment‖ preventing the state or any subdivision 
thereof from recognizing same-sex marriages. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 32(a). In 2009, well after the 
amendment had gone into effect, a man who had married another man in Massachusetts filed for 
divorce in a Texas state trial court. In re Marriage of J.B. & H.B., 326 S.W.3d 654, 659 (Tex. App. 
2010). The State intervened and argued that the court did not have subject matter jurisdiction because 
of the marriage amendment. Id. The trial judge disagreed, holding that the Texas laws violated the 
Federal Constitution, and refused to dismiss the divorce proceedings. Id. at 659–60. The State 
appealed this issue and prevailed before the appellate court, which engaged in a detailed analysis of the 
Equal Protection Clause as it applied to the legal recognition of same-sex marriages. See id. at 670–81. 
A few months later, though, the State lost a similar appeal involving a divorce of two women. See 
State v. Naylor, 330 S.W.3d 434 (Tex. App. 2011). The women, who had been married in 
Massachusetts, were granted a divorce by a Texas trial court. Id. at 436–37. The State then attempted 
to intervene, arguing that the divorce violated Texas law. Id. at 437–38. The trial court ignored the 
motion as untimely. Id. at 438. The State appealed, arguing that it had standing to defend its statutes 
from constitutional attacks, and that the divorce could not have been granted without an implicit 
finding that the Texas prohibition of legal recognition of same-sex marriage was unconstitutional. Id. 
at 439–41. The appellate court declined to find an implied constitutional challenge to the State‘s 
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cases should approach the traditional institution argument with a more 
overtly analytical response to help solidify the legitimacy of their 
decisions. 
Patrick Busch
 
 
prohibition on legal recognition of same-sex marriages, and found that the State did not have standing 
to appeal. Id. at 441–42, 444. 
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